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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Miguel Z. Zavala appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-

conviction

relief.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Miguel Z. Zavala was charged
murder.

(R., pp.102-03.1)

in a single-count information with attempted

The information alleged

he “unlawfully, deliberately,

that,

with premeditation, and with malice aforethought, attempt[ed] t0
wit: Carlos Alberto

Ochoa Zaragoza,

Sr.,

automobile and/or attempting to stab or

Zavala was tried over two days.
his counsel,

by attempting

(R., p.104.)

At

a

human

being, t0-

to run Zaragoza, Sr., over with

him With a knife.”

slice

kill

an

(Id.)

the close 0f the state’s evidence,

Mr. Gulstrom, made a Rule 29 motion requesting

that the attempted

murder

charge be dismissed and the case be submitted t0 the jury only 0n a charge 0f aggravated

battery.

(R., p.109.)

The court denied

objection to the ﬁnal jury instructions

the motion.

(id.),

The

(Id.)

which included an

included offense of aggravated battery (R., p.126).

(R.,

no

instruction as to a lesser-

The jury acquitted Zavala of

attempted murder and convicted him 0f aggravated battery. (R.,

Zavala ﬁled a direct appeal.

parties then indicated

p. 144.)

In an unpublished opinion

pp.145-52.)

addressing only an alleged abuse 0f sentencing discretion, the Court 0f Appeals afﬁrmed

1

The records from

the underlying criminal case are limited to those judicially noticed

the district court, including the information, court minutes

day trial, jury

instructions,

by

from the second day of a two-

and an amended notice of appeal.

(R., pp.101-52.)

Zavala’s judgment 0f conviction and sentence.

State V. Zavala,

Unpublished Opinion No. 771 (Idaho App. NOV.

9,

Docket N0. 43906, 2016

2016).

Zavala then ﬁled a petition for post-conviction relief

(R., pp.44-48),

along with a

separate, hand-written afﬁdavit setting out the alleged bases for relief (R., pp.7-18).

Though

the afﬁdavit

assistance of counsel

o

is

often difﬁcult t0 understand, he apparently alleged ineffective

0n the following grounds:

the “Victims” 0f his crime

argue as

much

had inconsistent

stories

and his

trial

counsel failed t0

0r to call the second Victim as a witness (R., p.11,

11111,

4; p.15,

1H9; p.16, ﬂ25; p.18, 1822);
o

his trial counsel failed to call “defense Witness

as a

0

key witness on the incident 0f 1-6-15”

and co-defendant Ambert Cover,

(R., p. 12, 1173);

his trial counsel failed t0 present evidence that

Zaragoza was the

initial

aggressor

and had a Violent character, including by presentation of evidence under Idaho
Rule of Evidence 404 regarding an alleged attack by Zaragoza on “Jose Escutia

and Adalberto Escutia” on April 26, 2015, as well as Zaragoza’s alleged gang

2

He

3

He

does not specify what he means by “Victims,” or who the “second Victim” was, as
only Zaragoza was named as a Victim in the information. (R., pp. 102-03.) Later, though,
he does refer to Zaragoza’s son as a Victim. (R., p.15, 1122.)
does not say What testimony she would

0r even

who

she

is.

offer,

“Ambert Cover” appears

to

Why he

refers t0 her as “co-defendant,”

be a typographical

error.

The minutes

from the underlying criminal proceeding refer t0 her once as “Amber Covert” (R., p. 148),
While Zavala’s post-conviction counsel refers t0 her as “Amber Colbert” (R., p.154). For
purposes of this

brief, the state will refer to

her as

“Amber

Colbert.”

afﬁliation (R., p.1

o

his trial counsel

1,

was

11113-6;

p.15,

W21-22;

p.17,

W26 — p.18,

ineffective because he did “not object

false evidence,” apparently a

181; p.18, 11344);

on the

state [sic]

use of

“bloody knife,” and did not argue that the prosecutor

should have prosecuted Zaragoza for the alleged attack on the Escutias (R., p.1

W46;
0

p.

1

5,

1H 8 (spelling corrected»;

his trial counsel failed t0 object to

an improper instruction 0n aggravated battery

— p.13,

as a lesser—included offense (R., p.12, ﬂS

He

also claimed that the district court deprived

ﬂlO).

him of a

fair trial

because he was not

permitted to argue self—defense and introduce the evidence he wanted t0 introduce at

(R., p.14, 1H 1; p.17, 11285)

lying at

trial

and

that the prosecuting attorney

trial

engaged in misconduct by

(R., p.14, 1114; p.16, 1123; p.17, 11276).

On December 22,
petition

1,

and provided

2016, the

thirty

district court

appointed counsel to assist With Zavala’s

days to ﬁle an amended petition and materials in support. (R.,

pp.53-55.) Over the next eleven months, the district court provided Zavala with repeated

extensions and opportunities t0 ﬁle an

amended

petition 0r additional materials t0

support his existing petition. (R., pp.53-54, 58-59, 62-64, 72, 80-82.) But 0n

4

Apparently t0 substantiate that

the

this attack occurred,

Homedale Police Department, along with

November

Zavala attached some records from

car repair estimates, bills, and medical

records. (R., pp.19-33.) Zavala’s afﬁdavit refers t0 “Adalberto Escutio” (R., p.11, 1B),
the records he submitted in support 0f his petition refer t0 “Analberto,” “Adalberto,” and

“Analberto Hurtado” (R., pp.148, 152), While the records from the underlying criminal
case judicially noticed by the district court refer to “Anaberto Escutio” (R., p.109). For

purposes of this
5

He

brief, the state Will refer t0

does not specify in what

him

way he was

as “Anaberto Escutio.”

limited in arguing self—defense, or

what

evidence speciﬁcally was improperly excluded.
6

He

does not specify what the prosecutor lied about, other than to mention a motion in

limine regarding police reports.

11,

2017, Zavala’s post-conviction counsel informed the

intend t0 do so.

(R., pp.83-84.)

move forward” based 0n
“Respondent

[sic]

the

Through

his counsel,

existing

petition

and

consisting of handwritten allegations

The

district court

he did not

Zavala stated that he “intends to

and materials submitted With

simply requests the Court consider

Petition including, the Petition, the Afﬁdavit

district court that

all

all

it:

documentation in support of his

papers attached to his Afﬁdavit

numbered paragraphs

1

through 34.” (R., p.83.)

took judicial notice 0f portions of the record from the underlying

criminal case (R., p.101), including the criminal information (R., pp.102-03), court

minutes from the second day of the two-day jury
(R., pp.1 15-44),

On
100.)

the

The

and an amended notice of appeal

same day,

it

issued notice of

district court ﬁrst stated that

its

(R., pp.

pp.104-14), jury instructions

145-5 1).

intent t0 dismiss the petition.

(R.,

pp.92-

aggravated battery appeared to be a lesser-

included offense 0f the attempted murder charge.

that

trial (R.,

(R., p.96.)

It

then independently held

Zavala presented n0 evidence by which the court could question his counsel’s

strategic decision not t0 object t0

an instructed regarding aggravated battery, nor any

evidence supporting that Zavala was prejudiced by that decision.

(Id.)

The

district court

then noted that the records from the underlying criminal case reﬂected that his

trial

counsel had argued self—defense and had introduced evidence of Zaragoza’s reputation for
Violence, pointing to the fact that the jury

was

instructed

0n self—defense and

“Jose and Analberto Escutia were called as defense witnesses and testified.”

E

R.,

that both

(R., p.97.

pp.108-09 (minutes reﬂecting that the Escutias testiﬁed as defense Witnesses);

p.133 (self—defense instruction).)

The

district court

again held that Zaragoza had not

introduced evidence to overcome the presumption that his

trial

counsel’s representation

was adequate,

particularly

Where the record reﬂected

that his counsel argued self—defense

and presented evidence regarding Zaragoza’s reputation for Violence.

(Id.)

As

to the

claim that Zavala’s counsel was deﬁcient for failing t0 impeach witnesses based on
alleged inconsistencies and for failure t0 rebut various arguments
the court noted that the decision “to ask certain questions or

strategic in nature.” (R., pp.97-98.)

his

made by the

make

prosecutor,

certain arguments is

Zavala failed t0 present evidence t0 demonstrate that

counsel’s representation constituted deﬁcient performance, or that there

was a

reasonable probability that he was prejudiced by that performance. (R., p.98.)

The

district

court

held

that

the

prosecutorial

misconduct claim—that the

prosecutor lied 0r presented false evidence—could have been addressed 0n direct appeal

and was therefore barred by Idaho Code

§ 19-4901(b).

(R., p.98.)

It

separately held that

Zavala had not presented any evidence t0 support any claim of misconduct.

(Id.)

Finally, regarding the claim that the district court in the underlying criminal case

abused

its

discretion

by refusing

t0 permit

Zavala t0 present certain evidence, and in

particular evidence of Zaragoza’s allegedly Violent disposition, the district court ﬁrst

noted that

it

appeared from his

Zavala 0n direct appeal.

Amended

(R., pp.98-99.

Notice 0f Appeal that the issue was raised by

E

R., p.146. (listing as

an issue on appeal that

“[t]he court improperly prohibited evidence of the Victim’s subsequent

then reiterated that the record reﬂected that Zavala’s

trial

bad

acts”).)

counsel presented such

evidence, that Jose and Anaberto Escutio were called as witnesses, that the jury

instructed

0n

self—defense,

and

that

It

was

an instruction was given on receiving evidence of

Zaragoza’s “reputation for Violence.” (R., p.99.

m

R., p.138 (jury instruction regarding

Zaragoza’s reputation for Violence).)

Again,

it

held that Zavala had not “supported his

allegation with admissible evidence.” (Id.)

The

provided twenty days for Zavala to ﬁle additional material or

district court

information to support his petition.

In

response,

(Id.)

Zavala claimed that the

allegations: (1) that “the Prosecutor

.

.

.

.

.

.

district

court

failed

address

to

two

engaged in misconduct, and/or defense counsel

did not provide effective assistance 0f counsel by failing to present testimony from

—

the second, alleged Victim

the son 0f Carlos Ochoa”; and (2) that “defense counsel

.

.

.

did not provide effective assistance 0f counsel by failing to present testimony 0f the
witness,

Amber

Colbert,

Who

testiﬁed that the Petitioner

witnessed the incident in this matter and

was

acting in self—defense.”

Who

(R., pp.153-54.)

could have

Zavala then

argued that he should be permitted to raise issues in post-conviction that were not raised

on

direct appeal because his appellate counsel in the direct appeal

from

his conviction

allegedly refused address any issues but for an alleged abuse 0f sentencing discretion.

(R., p.154.)

To support

that claim,

Zavala attached a

letter that his

counsel sent t0 his former appellate counsel requesting a copy of the
latter allegedly stated that

post-conviction

letter in

he would not address other issues on appeal.

which the

(R., p.156.)

Zavala did not submit any other evidence 0r argument in support of his petition, or
otherwise respond t0 the district court’s notice of its intent to dismiss.

The

district court

(R., pp.170-74.)

then issued an order summarily dismissing Zavala’s petition.

Regarding the alleged

failure t0 call

Zaragoza’s son or

Amber Colbert

as

Witnesses, the district court reiterated that “counsel’s decisions to call certain Witnesses,

ask certain questions, 0r

make

certain arguments is strategic in nature,”

and Zavala had

presented no evidence suggesting that the failure to call these particular Witnesses was

deﬁcient performance, or that he experienced prejudice as a

result.

(R., pp.171-72.)

Regarding the assertion that Zavala should be permitted to pursue issues on postconviction that could have been pursued 0n direct appeal, including prosecutorial

misconduct claims, the court held that Zavala submitted nothing
factual

showing by afﬁdavit, deposition or otherwise,

raises a substantial

doubt about the

reliability

19-4901(b)).)

While the

district court

make

a “‘substantial

that the asserted basis for relief

of the ﬁnding of guilt and could not, in the

exercise 0f due diligence, have been presented earlier.”

§

to

(R.,

acknowledged the

pp.172-73 (quoting

letter

I.C.

from Zavala’s post-

conviction counsel requesting the letter allegedly sent by Zavala’s appellate counsel,

noted that the
evidence.”

letter

it

from Zavala’s appellate counsel had “not been produced as

(R., p.173.)

For those reasons and the reasons articulated in

its

notice of

intent to dismiss, the district court dismissed Zavala’s claims for post-conviction relief.

(R., p.173.)

The

district court

(R., pp.181-84).

entered judgment (R., pp.175-76) and Zavala timely appealed

ISSUES
Zavala

1.

Did

states the issues

on appeal

as:

the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Zavala’s petition

for post—conviction relief because

he established issues 0f

fact as to

Whether ineffective assistance 0f counsel and prosecutorial misconduct
rendered his conviction unconstitutional?

2.

Did

the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Zavala’s petition

for post-conviction relief because the district court lacked subject-

matter jurisdiction over the aggravated battery charge?

3.

Did

the district court err in sua sponte dismissing Mr. Zavala’s petition

pursuant t0 I.C. § 19-4906 without considering the transcripts prepared
in the underlying direct appeal?
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Zavala shown that the district court erred in dismissing his claims for postconviction relief Where they were supported only by conclusory allegations and n0
argument or evidence?

2.

Should

this

Court reverse Zavala’s conviction because the

district court in the

underlying criminal case allegedly lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment and
sentence Zavala?

ARGUMENT
I.

Zavala Has Not

Shown That The

A.

When It Summarilv Dismissed His
BV Conclusorv Allegations

District Court Erred

Post-Conviction Claims Supported Only
Introduction

Zavala argues that the

district court erred in

summarily dismissing his claims for

post-conviction relief despite the fact that those claims were supported only

by Zavala’s

conclusory allegations, and With n0 evidence or citations to the record of the underlying
criminal case.

He

gives three arguments for that conclusion.

according t0 Zavala,

First,

it

was

either the state’s 0r the district court’s obligation

t0 support Zavala’s post-conviction claims

With relevant portions of the record from the

underlying criminal case and the district court could not summarily dismiss his petition

until

one 0f them did

Code

so.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.18-23.)

section 19-4906(a) imposes a burden

material portions of the record,

petition.

If

move

is

Zavala believed that the

portions of the record,

either

it

it

was

state t0

is

mistaken.

While Idaho

bear the cost 0f providing

ultimately the petitioner’s burden to support his

state failed to satisfy its

burden to provide material

his obligation to identify those portions

of the record and

the district court for an order requiring that the state provide

that the district court take judicial notice

district

on the

He

of them.

them 0r request

Instead, Zavala explicitly

court to determine the merits of his petition based only 0n

asked the

What he had

submitted—his bare, confusing, and conclusory allegations, and the records attached
his afﬁdavit.

(R., pp.83-84.)

Though

any error was invited by Zavala.

to

the district court properly dismissed his petition,

Next, Zavala argues that the

district court erred

ineffective assistance of counsel based

on an alleged

When

it

dismissed his claim of

failure to object to

battery instruction because, according t0 Zavala, aggravated battery

an aggravated

was not a

lesser-

included offense 0f the attempted murder charge. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-10.) This Court

need not reach the question whether aggravated battery was a lesser-included offense of
attempted murder because the
support

it

district court

properly dismissed the claim for failure t0

With anything but conclusory allegations.

Finally,

Zavala argues that the

district court erred

when

it

concluded that his claim

0f prosecutorial misconduct was barred by Idaho Code section 19-4901(b) because
could have been pursued in direct appeal.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.13-17.)

it

Again, this

Court need not reach the question whether the claim could have been addressed in direct
appeal because the district court independently held that the claim should be dismissed

for failure to support

B.

Standard

it

with anything but conclusory allegations.

Of Review

“[W]hen reviewing a

district court’s

order of

summary

dismissal in a post-

conviction relief proceeding, [this Court] app1[ies] the same standard as that applied by
the district court. Thus,

when reviewing such

a dismissal, this Court

must determine

Whether a genuine issue of fact exists based 0n the pleadings, depositions and admissions
together with any afﬁdavits on ﬁle.” Ridgley V. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925,

929 (2010).

“‘[W]here the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the

than a jury will be the

possibility

trier

of

fact,

summary judgment

is

trial

court rather

appropriate, despite the

of conﬂicting inferences because the court alone Will be responsible for

resolving the conﬂict between those inferences.” State V. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444,

10

180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008) (brackets in original) (quoting Riverside Dev. C0.
103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982)).
court Without a jury, the judge

is

“When an

(internal quotation

C.

t0

is t0

be

tried before the

not constrained t0 draw inferences in favor of the party

opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the

most probable inferences

action

V. Ritchie,

trial

judge

is

free t0 arrive at the

be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary

facts.”

Li.

marks omitted).

The District Court Properly Dismissed Zavala’s Petition Where It Was Supported
Only By Vague, Confusing, And Conclusorv Allegations, But N0 Evidence Or
Citations To The Record
Post-conviction

Procedure Act. LC.
entirely

new

§

proceedings

19-4901 — 491

are

1.

governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

A petition for post-conviction relief initiates “an

proceeding, distinct from the criminal action which led t0 [the] conviction.”

State V. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678,

662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). Idaho Code section

19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal 0f an application for post-conviction
response to a party’s motion 0r on the court’s

own

relief, in

initiative, if the applicant

“has not

presented evidence making a prima facie case as t0 each essential element of the claims

upon which

the applicant bears the burden 0f proof.” Berg V. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518,

960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).
application

E

alﬂ Yakovac, 145 Idaho

at

444, 180 P.3d

at

483 (“The

must present 0r be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting

allegations, or the application Will

allegations, unsupported

be subject t0 dismissal.”).

by admissible evidence and

sufﬁcient for a prima facie case.

A petitioner’s

its

conclusory

citations to the record, are not

ﬂ, gg, R_idgl_ey, 148 Idaho at 676-77, 227 P.3d at 930-

31 (holding that district court properly dismissed post—conviction petition for lack 0f

admissible evidence supporting claims of deﬁcient performance by counsel);

11

Roman

V.

m,

125 Idaho 644, 647-50, 873 P.2d 898, 901-04 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that post-

conviction claims were properly dismissed where they were supported only by conclusory

Baruth

allegations);

(“It is also

V.

Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986)

the rule that a conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated

to entitle a petitioner to

by any

fact, is

insufﬁcient

an evidentiary hearing”).

But for the conclusory allegations 0f

his afﬁdavit,

Zavala supported his petition

only With records associated With an alleged attack by his Victim, Zaragoza, that postdated the conduct with which Zavala was charged. (R., pp.19-32.7) Those records were

presumably intended to support his allegation that his counsel was ineffective for
t0 present evidence

0f his Victim’s Violent disposition. As the

district court

recognized,

they d0 not. (R., pp.96-97, 99.) The records from the underlying criminal case

was

the jury

failure

show

that

instructed as to self—defense and regarding the Victim’s alleged propensity for

Violence (R., pp.133, 138), and that the alleged Victims 0f the attack by Zaragoza—Jose

and Anaberto Escutio—testiﬁed for the defense

at trial (R.,

pp.108-09).

does not show an issue of material fact even as t0 the single claim to which

The

1.

District Court

Was Not Required T0 Sua

The evidence
it is

relevant.

Sponte Compel The State T0

Produce Or T0 Judiciallv Notice Some Unspeciﬁed Records Before
Dismissing Zavala’s Petition, Particularly In Light

T0 Resolve The

Petition

Based Exclusively

Of Zavala’s

On The

Invitation

Material

He

Submitted In Support

Zavala

argues

that

the

district

court

erred

when

it

dismissed

his

petition,

notwithstanding the lack of evidence 0r argument t0 support the elements 0f his claims,

7

That

is

true

though the

district court

repeatedly invited and provided opportunities to ﬁle

an amended petition and/or support the existing petition With additional material
pp.53-54, 58-59, 62-64, 72, 80-82), including
(R., p.99).

12

When

it

issued

its

(R.,

notice 0f intent to dismiss

because Idaho Code section 19-4906(a) “imposes the responsibility to pay for and

produce the transcripts on the
district court erred

“when

it

(Appellant’s brief, p.18.) According t0 Zavala, the

state.”

sua sponte dismissed Mr. Zavala’s petition Without either

ordering the state to comply with

its

obligation to produce the transcripts under Section

19-4906(a) 0r sua sponte judicially noticing the portions of the record that were material

t0

Mr. Zavala’s claims.” (Appellant’s

brief,

p.20

(italics in original).)

both on the merits and because he invited any

fails

Zavala’s argument

error.

Idaho Code section 19-4906 provides that the state must ﬁle “the record or
portions thereof that are material t0 the question raised in the application [for post-

conviction relief].” LC. § 19-4906(a). The statute therefore places a burden on the

but

does not thereby relieve Zavala 0f the burden t0 support his petition.

it

provides nor suggests that

state

it is

error for a district court to dismiss a petition

It

state,

neither

Where the

has provided n0 records, but the petitioner has not identiﬁed any records that

would

like the state to provide

provide any records.
responsibility to

pay

and has not moved the

district court to

Idaho Code section 19-4906(a) “imposes upon the

for the transcription.

If the state

does not ﬁle

the transcript in compliance with this statute, the applicant may,

compel the

state t0

compel the

d0 so.”

m,

125 Idaho

at

648

n.3,

all

at

state to

state

the

relevant portions 0f

by motion

873 P.2d

it

to the court,

902 n.3 (dismissing

claims for post-conviction relief unsupported by evidence 0r citations t0 the record). But,

even where the

state

does not

initially

provide transcripts or records on

its

own

initiative,

the statute does not “reliev[e] an applicant of the consequence of failing t0 place in

evidence a transcript essential t0 prove the applicant’s claim where, as here, the applicant

13

made n0

effort t0

transcript.”

compel action by the

state or to

otherwise arrange for the ﬁling of the

Li

There

is

a

good reason

for that rule,

which

this case illustrates.

included a Wide range 0f vague, often confusing allegations.

While

Zavala’s petition

it

is

sensible to

require the state t0 bear the cost and burden 0f producing transcripts and records

identiﬁed by a petitioner as supporting his allegations,
petitioner can avoid

summary

court have attempted to

sift

it

makes no sense

t0

suppose that a

dismissal merely because neither the state nor the district

through the record 0f the underlying criminal case in an

attempt t0 determine which portions support a large

conclusory allegations comprising the petition.

number of

disparate, vague,

and

Zavala was “better positioned t0 direct

the district court toward speciﬁc documents or t0 otherwise tailor his requests toward

relevant information” than either the state or the district court, and requiring either t0

identify the records that allegedly support Zavala’s

many, varied, and vague allegations

would improperly make them “advocate[s] of the moving party
would be gleaming
Idaho 407,

_,

as the judge [or the state]

facts” in an attempt to support Zavala’s petition.

431 P.3d 242, 251 (2018) (holding that

Rome

district court

V. State,

164

did not err in

denying a petition for post-conviction relief without ﬁrst granting petitioner’s broad and

vague requests for judicial notice 0f the record from the underlying criminal
also

DeRushe

V. State,

case).

E

146 Idaho 599, 602-03, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151-52 (2009) (holding

that the district court did not err in refusing to take judicial notice

of the record from the

underlying criminal case before dismissing petition for post-conviction relief though the

state

had not ﬁled any evidence

contends that

Rome

t0 controvert or support petitioner’s allegations).

Zavala

and DeRushe are inapposite because they concerned requests for

14

and not Whether the

judicial notice

19-4906(a).

state

(Appellant’s brief, p.20.)

judicial notice,

what they demonstrate

is

provided records pursuant t0 Idaho Code section

While those cases did deal with requests
that the district court does not err

for

by dismissing

a petition Where the petitioner “failed to present any admissible evidence showing he

was

entitled t0 relief,” notwithstanding the fact that the state failed t0 offer evidence to

“supplement

[petitioner’s] allegations”

and though the

district court

has not judicially

noticed the entire record from the underlying criminal case. DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 603,

200 P.3d

at 1152.

district court

The burden

t0 support the petition is ultimately

on the petitioner and a

does not err in dismissing a petition where the petitioner has

made n0

attempt to do so, including by identifying with speciﬁcity the materials the district court

should judicially notice or require the state to produce.

Zavala brieﬂy suggests that a
case because

it

dismissing a petition in such a

does not evaluate the petition “‘on the basis of the application, the answer

0r motion, and the recor

brief,

district court errs in

,”’

as required

by Idaho Code

p.18 (emphasis in original) (quoting Idaho

Code

(Appellant’s

section 19-4906(b).

section 19-4906(b)).)

If

Zavala

is

suggesting that the district court must have the entire record from the underlying criminal

case before

it

before resolving a petition, he

demonstrate, “record” in the context 0f Idaho

entire record

from the underlying criminal

374 P.3d 600

(Ct.

petitioner’s request that

it

Code

case.

App. 2016) (holding

is

incorrect.

As

m

and DeRushe

section 19-4906(b) does not

m

mean

the

also Fortin V. State, 160 Idaho 437,

that district court did not err in

denying

take judicial notice 0f the entire record from the underlying

criminal case and upholding

summary

dismissal of petitioner’s claim).

The

district court

here sua sponte judicially noticed portions of the record from the underlying criminal

15

case. (R., pp.101-52.)

Those materials, along With the materials submitted by Zavala

in

support of his petition (R., pp.19-32), comprised the “record” for purposes of evaluating
the petition under Idaho

Code

section 19-4906(b).

Again, t0 the extent that Zavala

believed that that record was inadequate, or that the district court did not judicially notice
the correct portions of the record

from the underlying criminal

should be required t0 provide certain portions 0f
contention t0 the district court’s attention.

But

it,

it is

it

was

case, or that the state

his obligation t0 bring that

factually incorrect that the district

court did not 100k to any portions of the record from the underlying criminal case in

resolving his petition, and

it is

was required

legally incorrect that the district court

the entire record from the underlying criminal case before

it

t0

have

prior to resolving his

petition.

Rather than pointing the

any alleged deﬁciencies

district court to

in the post-

conviction record before resolving his petition, Zavala explicitly asked the district court

to evaluate the petition

based only on what he had submitted.

reason, even if the district court erred, though

may

it

456, 460 (1985).

The purpose of

V. Caudill,

“caused or played an important role in prompting a

P.2d 117, 120 (1999).

amended

petition

in support

0n appeal.”

Through counsel, Zavala

and “simply request[ed]

trial

is t0

In other

prevent a party

who

court” to take a particular action

State V. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240,

985

stated that he did not intend t0 ﬁle an

that the Court consider all

of his Petition including, the Petition, the Afﬁdavit and

16

in.

109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d

the invited error doctrine

“later challenging that decision

For that

did not, Zavala invited that error. “[O]ne

not successfully complain of errors one has consented t0 0r acquiesced

words, invited errors are not reversible.” State

from

(R., pp.83-84.)

documentation ﬁled

all

papers attached to

his

(R.,

Afﬁdavit consisting of handwritten allegations numbered paragraphs
p.83.)

amended

1

through 34.”

After the district court provided numerous opportunities to submit an

petition 0r additional materials in support, he

the petition based exclusively

district court shortly thereafter

asked the

district court t0 evaluate

When

0n the materials he had already submitted.
issued

its

notice of intent t0 dismiss in

which

it

the

repeatedly

noting the absence of evidence to support a prima facie case regarding the elements of his

claims,

it

stated: “If

no

further information

is

received, the Court will dismiss the claim

In his response, Zavala

for post—conviction relief without further notice.” (R., p.99.)

made no mention of any

additional materials from the record of the underlying criminal

case that the court should review and did not suggest that the district court should require

the state to produce any records.

(R., pp.153-55.)

Zavala cannot ask the

district court to

resolve his petition based only on the materials he submitted and then argue 0n appeal

that the district court erred

by resolving

his petition Without reviewing

some unspeciﬁed

records from the underlying criminal case.

Zavala appears to argue that

court,

notwithstanding his

failure

this

t0

Court should nevertheless reverse the

district

support his petition and notwithstanding his

invitation t0 the district court to evaluate the petition based only

on the material he

submitted, because “[post—conviction] counsel not only failed t0 request judicial notice of

any portion of the underlying criminal record or
transcripts before ﬁling notice

brief, p.21

transcripts,

he did not review any

he would not amend Mr. Zavala’s petition.” (Appellant’s

(emphasis in original).)

T0

the extent that Zavala

is

arguing that this Court

should ﬁnd error below because his post-conviction counsel was allegedly ineffective,
that

argument

is

meritless.

As

to the invited error doctrine, Zavala’s

17

View would

Vitiate

the doctrine.

Faced With invited

error,

an appellant can always argue that the doctrine

should not apply because the error was invited only as a result of the ineffective
assistance of counsel below.

Nor does would the

ineffective assistance of post-conviction

Appellate review

counsel suggest that the district court erred in dismissing the petition.

0f a

district court’s

Which the

determination evaluates that determination in light 0f the record with

district court

was

presented, not the record With

presented had counsel been more competent.

Which

it

might have been

Moreover, allegations 0f deﬁcient

performance by post—conviction counsel, raised for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal, as Zavala has

done here, d0 not provide a basis for post-conviction
Court.

E

Mora

V. State,

relief and are not properly before the

159 Idaho 347, 349-50, 360 P.3d 356, 358-59

(Ct.

App. 2015)

(refusing to consider claims regarding alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction

counsel 0n appeal from dismissal of petition).

Finally,

court here, he

Zavala expresses concern that

may

he cannot secure reversal of the

not be able to pursue his post—conviction claims

While

brief, pp.22-23.)

if

that

Supreme Court precedent the

may be

validity

true,

it

of Which

is

would follow from
not at issue here.

at all.

district

(Appellant’s

well-settled Idaho

E Mumhy

V. State,

156 Idaho 389, 395, 327 P.3d 365, 371 (2014) (holding that alleged ineffective assistance

0f post-conviction counsel does not alone provide sufﬁcient reason t0 ﬁle a successive
petition);

Johnson

overrule

My).

V. State,

162 Idaho 213, 228, 395 P.3d 1246, 1261 (2017) (declining to

At any

rate,

whether or not Zavala can ﬁle a successive post-

conviction petition based in part 0n the allegation that his post-conviction counsel below

was

ineffective, that successive petition is not

18

now before this

Court.

The

district court

did not err in dismissing Zavala’s petition, at his invitation,

based on the record before

and including the materials

it

it

judicially noticed

from the

record 0f the underlying criminal case.

The

2.

Court Did Not Err In Dismissing Zavala’s Ineffective

District

Assistance Claim Based
Instruction

Alleged Failure T0 Object T0

it

mistakenly determined that aggravated battery

lesser-included offense 0f attempted murder.

lesser—included offense of the attempted murder charge.

district court

(Id.)

“It is

This Court need not reach

well settled that Where a

summary judgment on two independent grounds and

157 Idaho 156, 165, 335 P.3d

prevail

that the attorney’s

deﬁciency.”

0n an

1,

court

V.

Greenheart,

10 (2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks

afﬁrm on

that basis.

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner

must show

performance was deﬁcient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the

Grove

V.

State,

161 Idaho 840, 854, 392 P.3d 18, 32 (Ct. App. 2017).

“Strategic and tactical choices should not be second-guessed.”

Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988).
decisions are

trial

the appellant challenges only

one of those grounds on appeal, the judgment must be afﬁrmed.” Brown

“T0

in fact a

prima facie case with respect to the elements of

the ineffective assistance 0f counsel claim.

omitted). This Court should

is

independently held that the claim should be dismissed for

failure t0 present evidence supporting a

grants

He

(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-10.)

focuses exclusively 0n the substantive question Whether aggravated battery

The

Jury

dismissing one of his claims of

district court erred in

ineffective assistance 0f counsel because

that issue.

A

On An Aggravated Battery Charge

Zavala argues that the

was a

On An

made upon

Aragon

“However, ‘When counsel’s

V. State,

trial

114

strategy

the basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance 0f the applicable

19

law, 0r other shortcomings capable 0f objective evaluation, the defendant

have been denied effective assistance of counsel.”’
State V. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 10,

is

competent and that

show otherwise

is

539 P.2d 556, 562 (1975)).

trial tactics

0n the

Li (emphasis

were based 0n sound

petitioner.

“It is

may

very well

in original) (quoting

presumed

legal strategy,”

that counsel

and the burden

t0

Li

Addressing Zavala’s claim that his

counsel was ineffective for failure t0

trial

object t0 an instruction regarding aggravated battery, the district court ﬁrst stated that

aggravated battery was a lesser-included offense 0f the attempted murder charge.

p.96.)

Then, citing

W

for the proposition that tactical decisions

(R.,

0f trial counsel Will

not be second-guessed absent evidence that those decisions were based 0n “inadequate

preparation,

ignorance 0f relevant law, 0r other shortcomings capable of objective

evaluation,” the district court found that Zavala provided

facie case that his trial counsel’s representation

thereby.

(R., p.96.)

particular,

that

made n0

was deﬁcient and

After the district court issued

did not respond in any

way

t0 the district court’s

effort t0 substantiate the

n0 evidence

its

prima

he was prejudiced

notice of intent t0 dismiss, Zavala

comments regarding

claim that his

he was prejudiced by the alleged deﬁciency.

that

t0 support a

trial

this

claim and, in

counsel was deﬁcient or

(R., pp.153-55.)

As

the district court held, Zavala failed t0 provide any evidence t0 substantiate

this claim.

In fact, his afﬁdavit does not even clearly allege that his trial counsel failed to

object t0 the aggravated battery charge or that the failure to d0 so

assistance 0f counsel.

fashion that his

trial

Though Zavala’s form

was

ineffective

petition appears t0 allege in a conclusory

counsel did not obj ect to the instruction related to aggravated battery

(R., p.46), the portion

of his afﬁdavit addressed to the allegedly improper instruction does

20

not so

much

as

claim that his

mention his

trial

counsel. (R., p.12, ﬂS

— p.13, $2.) He does

at

one point

counsel was ineffective for failing to obj ect to a jury instruction, but he

identiﬁes jury instruction

instruction

trial

number

number

six as the offending instruction.

was addressed

six

with aggravated battery.

t0 the deﬁnition

criminal case judicially noticed

by

Jury

of “attempt” and had nothing to do

The minutes from

(R., p.124.8)

(R., p.14, 1116.)

the

trial

of the underlying

the district court reﬂect that neither party

had

objections t0 the ﬁnal jury instructions (R., p.109), which included an instruction

regarding aggravated battery as a lesser-included offense (R., p.126).

But

it

appears as

though aggravated battery was already in the case by that point as Zavala’s counsel had

moved

already

to dismiss the attempted

only on aggravated battery.
battery entered the case,

been

murder charge and submit the case

(R., p.109.)

to the jury

The record does not reﬂect how aggravated

What objections were

offered, 0r

what considerations might have

at issue.

But even
decision

was

if trial

strategic.

counsel did not object t0 the aggravated battery charge, that

Courts have regularly held that the decision not to request an

instruction for an alleged lesser—included offense

is tactical.

E, gg, Yon V.

State,

124

Idaho 821, 823, 864 P.2d 659, 661 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that decision not t0 request
lesser-included offense instruction

because

trial

counsel

was

may have been

tactical decision, not

attempting t0 secure a

tactical choice

whether

tactical choice

Whether to object to such an instruction.

8

deﬁcient representation,

full acquittal).

t0 request a lesser-included offense instruction,

Counsel

may

it is

If

it

is

a

likewise a

calculate that the

Zavala did not provide any explanation as to What was allegedly incorrect regarding that

deﬁnition.
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defendant

is

very likely to be convicted 0n the greater, more serious charge absent an

option for conviction on

some

lesser charge, conclude that the defendant is better off if

on

the jury has that option, and elect not to object to the instruction

counsel

may

100k more favorably 0n a Rule 29 motion t0 dismiss the greater offense

a charge for a lesser offense will

due

Likewise,

acquiesce t0 an instruction regarding a lesser charge in the hope that the

district court will

if

that basis.

to the paucity

0f the record below,

g0

it

t0 the jury.

Though

it is

appears that Zavala’s

very difﬁcult to say

trial

counsel

may have

(R.,

p.109 (reﬂecting that counsel made a Rule 29

that the attempted

murder charge be dismissed and the case be

been making such a calculation.

motion requesting

still

submitted t0 the jury only on aggravated battery).)

The

tactical nature

0f the choice

is

highlighted by the fact that the reward for successfully arguing that aggravated battery

was not a

lesser-included offense of attempted murder

would only have been

to subject

Zavala t0 an independent prosecution for aggravated battery.

Even

if the

record reﬂected that his

trial

counsel failed to object to the instruction

as t0 aggravated battery, Zavala failed t0 present

that his trial counsel’s representation

decision.

The

tactical nature

any evidence to rebut the presumption

was adequate and

that such failure

was not a

tactical

of the decision whether to object t0 the instruction does not

hinge 0n Whether aggravated battery was in fact a lesser-included offense of attempted
murder.
court’s

Zavala’s argument on that point

ﬁnding

that

is

therefore largely irrelevant to the district

Zavala failed t0 present evidence to support a prima facie case for the

elements of an ineffective assistance 0f counsel claim. This Court should afﬁrm.
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The

3.

District

Court Did Not Err In Dismissing Zavala’s Prosecutorial

Misconduct Claim
Zavala vaguely alleged below that the prosecuting attorney engaged in misconduct
at trial.

.

.

Because post—conviction

(R., p.14, 1H4; p.16, 1123.)

relief “is not a substitute for

.

an appeal from the sentence or conviction,”

Any

Which could have been raised 0n direct appeal, but was not, is
forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless
it appears to the court, on the basis 0f a substantial factual showing by
issue

afﬁdavit, deposition 0r otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a
substantial doubt about the reliability of the
in the exercise

LC.

§ 19-4901(b).

of due diligence, have been presented

Thus, where

appeal, a petitioner

ﬁnding 0f guilt and could

it

earlier.

appears that a claim could have been pursued 0n direct

must make a “substantial

factual

showing” both that “the asserted

basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the

that the claim “could not, in the exercise

Id.

The

district court

not,

ﬁnding 0f guilt” and

0f due diligence, have been presented

earlier.”

held below that Zavala could have pursued his prosecutorial

misconduct claim on appeal and so

it

was barred by Idaho Code

section 19-4901(b).

(R.,

p.98, 172-73.)

On

appeal, Zavala argues that the district court erred

when

claim was barred pursuant t0 Idaho Code section 19-4901(b).

17.)

He

it

determined that the

(Appellant’s brief, pp.13-

appears to argue that he could not have pursued his prosecutorial misconduct

claim 0n direct appeal because there was n0 objection t0 the prosecutorial misconduct

trial,

the claim

would

at

therefore have been subject t0 the fundamental error standard of

review on direct appeal, and

on the face of the

record.

objected to during

trial

it

would have been

rejected because the error

was not

(Appellant’s brief, p.17 (“The alleged misconduct

proceedings.

plain

was not

These allegations are not reviewable under the
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fundamental error doctrine articulated in Perry and raising them 0n direct appeal Without
a factual record would require an averse

For two reasons,
district court

[sic]

ruling that

would become

res judicata.”).)

Court does not need t0 reach Zavala’s argument.

this

First, the

provided an alternative ground for the dismissal 0f Zavala’s claim for

prosecutorial misconduct. In

its

notice of intent to dismiss,

it

stated that the claim should

alternatively be dismissed for failure t0 present evidence t0 substantiate the conclusory

allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.

(R., p.98.)

Zavala did not thereafter provide any

evidentiary support for that claim, suggest that he needed additional time to do so, or in

any way respond
pp.153-55.)

t0 the district court’s

When it

issued

its

court

(R., p.173.)

was obligated

But for

(R.,

order dismissing Zavala’s petition, the district court did so

for the reasons articulated therein

dismiss.

comments regarding lack 0f evidence.

and for the reasons articulated

in

its

notice of intent to

his general argument, addressed above, that the district

to ensure that

some unspeciﬁed portion of

the record from the

underlying criminal case was produced prior to dismissing his claims, Zavala does not
address the district court’s conclusion that there

was n0 admissible evidence

his conclusory allegations regarding prosecutorial misconduct.

where a

trial

court grants

“It is

to support

well settled that

summary judgment 0n two independent grounds and

appellant challenges only one 0f those grounds

afﬁrmed.” Greenheart, 157 Idaho

at 165,

335 P.3d

the

0n appeal, the judgment must be
at

10 (brackets and internal quotation

marks omitted).
Second, Zavala did not argue below that his prosecutorial misconduct claim
required the development 0f a factual record and

appeal, or that the fundamental error standard
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was

therefore not amenable to direct

had some relevance

to

whether the claim

could be pursued 0n direct appeal.
dismiss, in

which

it

In response t0 the district court’s notice of intent to

noted that Zavala did “not present[] any evidence as to

why the

issue

could not have been raised earlier” (R., p.98), Zavala’s post-conviction counsel suggested

only that Zavala could not have raised the prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct
appeal because his former appellate counsel insisted in a

letter that

he would only pursue

sentencing issues (R., p.154). Zavala’s post-conviction counsel did not attach that

but instead attached a

requested

(R.,

it.

the ﬁrst time

letter

he sent to Zavala’s former appellate counsel in which he

pp.154-56.9)

on appeal

.”
.

.

.

“[T]his Court will not address issues raised for

State V. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706,

(2012) (refusing t0 address issues and arguments not raised below).
that the

302 P.3d 328, 331
If

Zavala believed

claim could not have been pursued on direct appeal because

development 0f a factual record, he should have raised

He

letter,

it

required

that issue with the district court.

did not d0 so.

But Zavala’s argument also

fails

on the

merits.

Zavala

is

essentially asking this

Court to apply a categorical exception t0 the procedural bar 0f Idaho Code section 194901(b) for claims of unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct, so that such a claim can

always be pursued in post-conviction proceedings whether 0r not any showing has been

9

Zavala has apparently abandoned the argument that his former appellate counsel’s

refusal to address issues other than an alleged abuse of sentencing discretion rendered

him

it

misconduct claim on direct appeal. The
from Zavala’s post-conviction counsel to Zavala’s
former appellate counsel did not constitute a substantial factual showing that the
prosecutorial misconduct claim could not have been pursued on direct appeal.
(R.,
impossible for
district court

to pursue his prosecutorial

concluded that the

letter

p.173.) Here, Zavala does not take issue With that conclusion, but argues only that

inappropriate for the district court t0 require that he
place.
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make such

it

was

a showing in the ﬁrst

made

that the claim could not

section 19-4901(b)

is

have been pursued on direct appeal.

But Idaho Code

regularly applied to bar claims 0f prosecutorial misconduct in post-

conviction proceedings.

E, gg, Rodgers V.

State,

129 Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348,

353 (1997) (afﬁrming dismissal 0f prosecutorial misconduct claim as barred in postconviction proceedings for failure to pursue

it

on

direct appeal); Shackelford V. State,

Idaho 317, 324, 372 P.3d 372, 379 (2016) (same); Raudebaugh

V. State,

135 Idaho 602,

606, 21 P.3d 924, 928 (2001) (ﬁnding that prosecutorial misconduct claim

LC.

§

because

19-4901(b)

“[i]t

is

well

established

that

160

was barred by

applicants

for post-

conviction relief are not allowed to raise issues in post-conviction proceedings that could

have been raised on direct appeal unless the issues were not known and could not
reasonably have been

known

during the direct appeal”); Grove

V. State,

161 Idaho 840,

852, 392 P.3d 18, 30 (Ct. App. 2017) (ﬁnding that prosecutorial misconduct claim

barred in post-conviction proceedings for failure to pursue

0n

it

2017); Barcella

V.

State,

no reason

t0 believe that

was

Where

have been addressed on

petitioner alleged in a conclusory fashion that claim could not

direct appeal but provided

direct appeal

was

correct),

review denied (Apr.

148 Idaho 469, 475, 224 P.3d 536, 542

(Ct.

18,

App. 2009)

(prosecutorial misconduct claim barred in post—conviction proceedings); Bias V. State,

159 Idaho 696, 702-03, 365 P.3d 1050, 1056-57

Nor does

(Ct.

App. 2015) (same).

the existence 0f any such exception hinge

0n Whether there was an

objection t0 the alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the underlying criminal case.

Black

V. State,

No. 45432, 2019

In

WL 1053232 (Idaho App. Mar. 6, 2019), the Idaho Court

of Appeals addressed and rejected the argument

that, in light

of the fundamental error

standard governing the direct review of unobjected-to errors, such “errors
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may be

directly

attacked in post-conviction proceedings, despite not being raised in the

direct appeal,”

Li. at

*4.”

Violation

court or on

trial

and notwithstanding the procedural bar of Idaho Code section 19-4901(b).

The Court 0f Appeals held

was not

objected-to at the

that the

trial level

mere

fact that

an alleged constitutional

does not imply that the constitutional

Violation can be directly pursued in a petition for post-conviction relief, rather than

on

direct appeal. Li. at *4-5. Instead, absent evidence that the constitutional claim could not

have been presented 0n direct appeal, the issue can be challenged in post-conviction
proceedings Via a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Li.

at

E

alﬂ

703, 365 P.3d at 1057 (holding that because petitioner “presented no evidence as t0

Why

the issue [0f alleged prosecutorial misconduct] could not have been presented

direct appeal, [petitioner] has

waived the

issue,”

at 852,

392 P.3d

at

To support

dispute

is

the contrary View, Zavala cites a

number 0f

(Appellant’s brief, p.15.) But that proposition

whether a petitioner

raised and the petitioner

cases cited

errs in

Zavala

161 Idaho

cases for the proposition

can sometimes be directly challenged through post-conviction

is

is

not in dispute.

made n0 showing

by Zavala suggests

What

as required

by

that a petitioner is entitled to

Code

Black

is

in

section 19-4901(b)

that section.

do so or

None of the

that a district court

applying the procedural bar of that section under those circumstances.

may have

is

entitled to raise constitutional errors directly through

post-conviction proceedings though the procedural bar of Idaho

was

m,

3O (same).

that constitutional errors

proceedings.

0n

though claims of unpreserved error could

have been pursued through an ineffective assistance of counsel claim);

10

M, 159 Idaho

While

avoided the procedural bar of Idaho Code section 19-4901(b) by making

a published opinion, but

is

not yet ﬁnal.
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a showing below that his claim required the development 0f a factual record, he

made n0

attempt to do so.

Finally,

Zavala made n0 attempt t0 provide any evidence that his prosecutorial

misconduct claim “raises a substantial doubt about the

LC.

reliability

of the ﬁnding of guilt.”

§ 19-4901(b).

II.

To Address The Question Whether The District Court In The
Underlying Criminal Case Lacked Jurisdiction Over The Aggravated Battery Charge;
But, If The Court Does Address That Issue, The District Court Had Jurisdiction

This Court Should Decline

Zavala asks

this

Court t0 ﬁnd that the

district court in the

underlying criminal case

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the aggravated battery charge and t0 vacate
Zavala’s conviction 0n that basis.

decline t0 address the argument because Zavala could have raised

it

is

therefore barred

by Idaho Code section 19-4901(b).

address the argument, and even if aggravated battery

attempted murder, the

district court

This Court should

(Appellant’s brief, pp.11-13.)

it

0n

But even

was not a

direct appeal

if this

and

Court does

lesser-included offense of

had subject matter jurisdiction

to enter a conviction

and sentence.

As

a purely legal argument addressed only to the record of the underlying criminal

case, Zavala could

conviction.

have pursued his jurisdictional challenge through direct appeal of his

The procedural bar 0f Idaho Code

section 19-4901(b) therefore applies. This

Court should decline t0 address the argument 0n that basis. But Zavala’s argument also
fails

0n the merits; the

district court

had jurisdiction

Idaho Supreme Court resolved this issue in State

(2016).

The

district court in that case

V.

in the underlying criminal case.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1,

The

368 P.3d 621

agreed t0 dismiss a trafﬁcking charge, but

28

0n possession with

instructed the jury

intent to deliver, a charge that

determined to be a lesser-included offense of trafﬁcking.

Li. at 4,

368 P.3d

it

mistakenly

at

624. After

he was convicted of possession With intent t0 deliver, McIntosh argued 0n appeal that the
district court

because

Li.

it

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to impose the sentence for that charge

erred

Though

when

it

determined that

it

was a

lesser-included offense 0f trafﬁcking.

the Court agreed that possession with intent t0 deliver

was not a

lesser-

included offense of trafﬁcking, the Court nevertheless held that the district court had
jurisdiction to enter a conviction

P.3d

at

and impose a sentence for

368

Li. at 6-7,

626-27.

That conclusion followed from three premises:
a criminal case

(internal quotation

was committed

marks omitted).

in the State

(2)

correctness of any decision

brackets omitted).

the court.”

Li

Because McIntosh did not argue

inadequate to confer jurisdiction

jurisdiction.

judgment on appeal.”

(3) “Subject matter jurisdiction

made by

Li. at 7,

368 P.3d

Li. at 6,

judgment becomes ﬁnal,

the time for appeal 0r afﬁrmance of the

ellipsis omitted).

0f Idaho.”

368 P.3d

either

by expiration of

Li. (internal quotation

does not depend 0n

(internal quotation

that the charging

.

.

Li.

.

the

marks and

document was

initially,

(1) entailed that the district court acquired

at 627.

In light of (2), the district court retained

jurisdiction despite the fact that the trafﬁcking charge in the original indictment

dismissed.

626

at

“Unless a statute or rule provides otherwise, the

court’s jurisdiction expires once the

marks and

(1) “Subject matter jurisdiction in

conferred by the ﬁling of an information, indictment, or complaint

is

alleging an offense

trial

that charge.

In light 0f (3), that

is

was

so notwithstanding the fact that the district court

mistakenly submitted an instruction for possession with intent t0 deliver to the jury. Li.
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“Even though the
deliver,

the

district court erred in

district

court’s

error

giving an instruction 0n possession with intent t0

did not remove the

trial

court’s

subject

matter

jurisdiction.” Li.

Assuming arguendo

that the district court erred in giving

aggravated battery, precisely the same

0f the charging document in

is

true here. Zavala

this case, so the district court

is

an instruction 0n

not attacking the sufﬁciency

acquired jurisdiction.

not cite any statute 0r rule suggesting that the district court relinquished

its

He

does

jurisdiction

before the judgment became ﬁnal 0r before the expiration of the time for appeal, so the

had jurisdiction When

district court still

Any

aggravated battery charge.

retroactively render the charging

court of jurisdiction, so

it

entered a conviction and sentence 0n the

error in providing a mistaken jury instruction did not

document inadequate or otherwise deprive the

irrelevant t0 jurisdiction

it is

Whether the

district court

district

included

an erroneous jury instruction.

According

t0 Zavala, “the district court [in the underlying criminal case here] lost

subj ect matter jurisdiction

in the Information

When

the jury acquitted Mr. Zavala of the only offense charged

and no properly ﬁled charging document ever conferred jurisdiction

over the entirely distinct charge 0f aggravated battery.”

The

distinction

McIntosh, the

between

this case

(Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13.)

and McIntosh, according

district court [in the

to Zavala, is that “[u]nlike in

underlying criminal case here] did not dismiss the

attempted murder charge and allow the jury t0 continue only
offense.” (Appellant’s brief, p.13.) That

was

is,

district court

the lesser, uncharged

the “greater” offense here, attempted murder,

in the case longer, going to the jury, than

which was dismissed by the

[sic]

was

the “greater” offense in McIntosh,

before the case

30

was submitted

to the jury.

But

Zavala provides n0 hint

Why

that fact

would suggest

that the district court in

McIntosh

retained jurisdiction over the “lesser offense” longer, through sentencing, while the

district court

here allegedly did not.

jurisdiction to enter a conviction

In both cases, the respective district courts retained

and sentence 0n the “lesser” offenses because, “[u]nless

a statute 0r rule provides otherwise, the

judgment becomes ﬁnal,

either

by

trial

court’s jurisdiction

at 6,

368 P.3d

directly

was

(Ct.

on

expires once the

McIntosh,

instruction.

clearly resolves this issue, State V. Herrera, 149 Idaho 216,

App. 2009), a case

point.

.

at 626.

Though McIntosh
P.3d 147

.

expiration of the time for appeal or afﬁrmance 0f the

judgment 0n appeal,” notwithstanding an erroneously—given jury
160 Idaho

.

relied

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

precisely the argument Zavala

is

upon by

at 6,

the Court in McIntosh,

368 P.3d

offering here:

“greater” charge, but convicted as t0 a charge

at

626.

233

m

even more

is

The argument

in

Where the jury acquitted 0n a

0n Which the

district court

erroneously

instructed the jury as a lesser-included offense, Herrera argued that the district court

lacked jurisdiction over the allegedly improper lesser-included offense.

Idaho

at

m,

149

221, 233 P.3d at 152. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that

“[e]ven if an improper lesser included offense instruction was given, the court’s subject

matter jurisdiction that was conferred Via the indictment remained throughout the
for subj ect matter jurisdiction does not

by the

court.” Li. at 221-22,

233 P.3d

trial,

depend upon the correctness 0f any decision made

at

152-53.

This Court should not address Zavala’s argument that the

district court in the

underlying criminal case lacked jurisdiction over the charge 0f aggravated battery. But, if

it

does address that argument, there

is

no question
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that the district court

had jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

dismissing Zavala’s petition for post-conviction

DATED this

lst

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

judgment

relief.

day 0f May, 2019.
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